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PUBLIC ACCESS TO POLICE BODY CAMERA FOOTAGE—IT’S 
STILL NOT CRYSTAL CLEIR 
Jack Greiner* and Darren Ford** 
INTRODUCTION 
In December 2016, the Ohio Supreme Court released decisions in two 
momentous public records cases.1 The first decision involved video 
footage from the dashboard cameras of two state highway patrol 
officers.2 In that case, the Court held that the majority of information 
recorded by the cameras was a public record, and not exempt under the 
exceptions for certain types of law enforcement and prosecutorial 
records.3  
The second decision involved video footage from a police body 
camera, but the Court’s holding did not establish whether the footage at 
issue was a public record.4 Rather, the Court addressed only whether the 
Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney had unreasonably delayed 
release of the body camera footage, which captured University of 
Cincinnati officer Ray Tensing shooting Samuel Dubose.5 Because the 
Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney released the video shortly after 
suit was filed, the Court concluded that the case was moot, and that 
assuming the footage was a public record, the delay between the request 
and ultimate release was reasonable.6 
In January 2017, Cincinnati Police arrested Cincinnati Bengal Adam 
Jones for assault and disorderly conduct.7 Though body-cameras 
recorded much of the incident in a nine-minute video, the Cincinnati 
Police Department (CPD) did not release the entire recording until after 
 
            * Adjunct Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati College of Law, Partner, Graydon Head & 
Ritchey, LLP, J.D., University of Notre Dame. 
            ** Associate, Graydon Head & Ritchey, LLP, J.D., University of Cincinnati College of Law. 
 1. State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Ohio Dept. of Pub. Safety, 148 Ohio St.3d 433, 2016-
Ohio-7987, 71 N.E.3d 258; State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Deters, 148 Ohio St.3d 595, 2016-Ohio-
8195, 71 N.E.3d 1076. 
 2. State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Ohio Dept. of Pub. Safety, 148 Ohio St.3d 433, 2016-
Ohio-7987, 71 N.E.3d 258. 
 3. Id. at ¶ 50. 
 4. State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Deters, 148 Ohio St.3d 595, 2016-Ohio-8195, 71 N.E.3d 
1076, ¶ 21. 
 5. Id. at ¶ 22. 
 6. Id. at ¶¶ 21-22. 
 7. Kevin Grasha and Cameron Knight, Adam ‘Pacman’ Jones Pleads, Police Release Full 
Arrest Video, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, May 16, 2017, 
https://www.cincinnati.com/story/news/2017/05/16/adam-pacman-jones-pleads-obstructing-
police/324744001/. The case was filed in Hamilton County, Ohio. The case number was /17/CRB/132 
[hereinafter Jones Pleads]. 
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a county judge dismissed the charges against Jones.8 
As police action comes under more scrutiny, increased transparency 
matters even when no one suspects police abuse. Few professions place 
people in scenarios as dangerous as those which police officers face. 
Most police officers handle dangerous situations with good judgment. 
But when an objective record is necessary to examine how a situation 
unfolded—whether to vindicate an officer’s decision or punish bad 
police work—body camera footage provides an unbiased, even if 
sometimes imperfect, witness.  
This Article will analyze the current state of the Ohio Public Records 
Act and the exception for confidential law enforcement investigation 
records as they relate to the release of footage from police body 
cameras. Part I will summarize the development of the relevant law 
through a series of significant cases decided by the Supreme Court of 
Ohio. Part II will use a case study to demonstrate the appropriate 
analysis for showing that footage from police body cameras do not 
constitute confidential law enforcement investigation records. Part III 
will explore the related issue of the timing of the release of public 
records, arguing that waiting until the completion of trial is still too late. 
Finally, Part IV will conclude that the Ohio Supreme Court’s decisions 
open the window for increased transparency with respect to police body 
camera footage, but wrongly keep the window closed on the timing 
issue. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Ohio Public Records and the CLEIR Exception 
Ohio Revised Code § 149.43(B) provides that public offices shall 
promptly make available all non-exempt public records to anyone who 
requests them.9 R.C. § 149.43(A)(2), however, exempts confidential law 
enforcement investigatory records.10 Known as the CLEIR exception, it 
exempts from release “any record that pertains to a law enforcement 
matter of a criminal, quasi-criminal, civil, or administrative nature,” but 
only if that record’s release creates a high risk of disclosing one of four 
types of information: (1) an uncharged suspect’s identity; (2) 
information from a witness who has been promised confidentiality, 
when that information could disclose the witness’s identity; (3) specific 
confidential investigatory techniques or procedures or specific 
 
 8. Id. 
 9. R.C. § 149.43(B)(2016). 
 10. R.C. § 149.43(A)(2)(2016). 
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investigatory work product; and (4) information whose release could 
endanger law enforcement personnel, a victim, a witness, or a 
confidential source.11 
If a record falls within one of the four categories, a public office may 
refuse to release the record. The Supreme Court of Ohio has issued a 
number of opinions examining the third category, which pertains to 
specific confidential investigatory techniques or specific investigatory 
work product.12 
In State ex rel. Steckman v. Jackson, the Ohio Supreme Court held 
that information gathered by law enforcement officials relating to a 
“probable or pending criminal proceeding,” or gathered in anticipation 
of litigation, is work product and therefore exempt from release under 
R.C. 149.43(A)(2)(c).13 The Supreme Court in Steckman attempted to 
correct what it perceived to be an abuse of R.C. 149.43 by criminal 
defendants.14 Criminal defendants frequently requested prosecutors’ 
files pursuant to Criminal Rule 16 and any other records gathered by 
police departments pursuant to R.C. 149.43.15 According to the Court, 
long delays in criminal trials often resulted when criminal defendants 
used R.C. 149.43 to request information unavailable to them under 
Criminal Rule 16.16 The Court attempted to control this perceived abuse 
of R.C. 149.43 by holding that information not subject to discovery 
under Criminal Rule 16 was not subject to release as a public record. 
reasoning that such information constituted trial preparation records and 
work product under R.C. 149.43(A)(2)(c).17  
B. Routine Incident Reports 
One principle that Steckman reiterated, however, and which remains 
authoritative, is that routine offense and incident reports are subject to 
release immediately upon request.18 
In State ex rel. Beacon Journal Publishing Company et al., v. Maurer, 
 
 11. Id. 
 12. See, e.g., State ex rel. Steckman v. Jackson (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 420, 639 N.E.2d 83; State 
ex rel. Beacon Journal Publishing Company et al., v. Maurer (2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 54; State ex rel. 
Cincinnati Enquirer v. Hamilton County (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 374, 378; State ex rel. Cincinnati 
Enquirer v. Ohio Dept. of Pub. Safety, 148 Ohio St.3d 433, 2016-Ohio-7987, 71 N.E.3d 258 
 13. State ex rel. Steckman v. Jackson (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 420, 639 N.E.2d 83, 94. 
 14. Id. at 89. 
 15. See id. at 92. 
 16. Id. at 89. 
 17. Id. at 94. Post-Steckman, once a record became exempt as a “trial preparation record,” it 
remained exempt until all trials, actions, or proceedings were exhausted. Steckman, at 92. The Supreme 
Court of Ohio has since overruled that part of Steckman in State ex rel. Caster v. Columbus, 151 Ohio 
St.3d 425, 2016-Ohio-8394, 89 N.E.3d 598. 
 18. Id. at 91, 94. 
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the Court stated that incident reports initiate, but are not part of, 
investigations.19 Maurer rejected the argument that an incident report 
qualifies for the CLEIR exception.20 Public offices accordingly were 
required to make incident reports available immediately upon request.21 
The same logic applied to 911 calls in State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer 
v. Hamilton County.22 Since 911 calls usually precede incident reports, 
“they are even further removed from the initiation of the criminal 
investigation than the form reports themselves.”23  
The unredacted incident reports released in Maurer revealed the 
names of the police officers who shot and killed the man during the 
incident.24 These officers were uncharged suspects in a shooting death 
within the meaning of R.C. 149.43(A)(2)(a). But because their names 
appeared in the incident report, the “public records cloak” had 
descended upon everything contained within that incident report.25 
Records containing information otherwise falling within one of the four 
categories of information covered by the CLEIR exception could not be 
“defrocked of their status” as public records.26 
C. Work Product Exception 
Maurer acknowledged that the CLEIR analysis begins with a two-
step test.27 First, does the record meet the definition of a confidential 
law enforcement record? Second, would the record’s release increase the 
risk of disclosure of one of the four types of information?  
In the dash-cam footage case, Justice French sharply distinguished 
these two steps.28 At issue in State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Ohio 
Dept. of Pub. Safety (“ODPS”) were three recordings taken from dash-
cams. Justice French first asked whether the recordings “pertain[ed] to a 
law-enforcement matter of a criminal or quasicriminal nature.”29 
According to Justice French, the recordings “easily” met this element 
 
 19. State ex rel. Beacon Journal Publishing Company et al., v. Maurer (2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 54, 
56, 2001-Ohio-282, 741 N.E.2d 511, 513. 
 20. Id. at 54. 
 21. Id. at 57. 
 22. State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Hamilton County (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 374, 378. 
 23. Maurer, 741 N.E.2d at 514 (quoting Hamilton Cty., 75 Ohio St.3d at 378). 
 24. Id. at 513. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. at 514. 
 27. Id. at 513. 
 28. State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Ohio Dept. of Pub. Safety, 148 Ohio St.3d 433, 2016-
Ohio-7987, 71 N.E.3d 258, ¶ 38-40. 
 29. Id. at ¶ 39. 
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because the trooper had observed traffic violations.30 
The second step called for a “case-by-case review” to determine 
whether the recordings contained investigative work product.31 The 
investigative discretion exercised by the troopers in making the 
recordings factored heavily into the analysis. And since the troopers 
exercised no discretion in what they recorded, the only segment of the 
recordings the Court held could have been permissibly withheld was a 
90-second portion in which the trooper took the suspect to the patrol car, 
gave him his Miranda rights, and questioned him.32 The Court’s 
reasoning here suggests that the troopers’ decision to conduct the 
questioning within range of the dash-cam was intentional, and done for 
the purpose of preserving evidence for a likely future prosecution. 
Accordingly, the captured information constituted “investigative work 
product compiled in anticipation of litigation.”33  
Most of the footage, however, was not exempt. First, much of what 
was recorded was “the same information in the incident reports, which 
ODPS released promptly without redaction.”34 For instance, during the 
chase, the trooper noted for the dash-cam the various traffic violations 
she witnessed the suspect commit.35 These details appeared on the 
unredacted incident report.36 Furthermore, the unredacted incident report 
contained investigative steps the dash-cam did not record, such as the 
trooper’s administrative search.37  
Second, the troopers were “expected to record all pursuits and traffic 
stops,” even when no criminal prosecution may have followed.38 The 
dash-cams began filming as soon as the troopers activated their lights 
and sirens.39 For this reason, the Court found that troopers do not 
exercise discretion when activating their dash-cams, in contrast to dash-
cam footage of crash scenes, which troopers may make in their 
discretion if they believe the footage would provide useful evidence.40 
The Court observed that the State would have a stronger argument for 
exempting dash-cam footage from release if “a dash-cam recording was 
 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at ¶¶ 45, 50. 
 32. Id. at ¶ 46. 
 33. State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Ohio Dept. of Pub. Safety (“ODPS”), 148 Ohio St.3d 
433, 2016-Ohio-7987, 71 N.E.3d 258, ¶ 46. 
 34. Id. at ¶ 47. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id.  
 37. Id. 
 38. State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Ohio Dept. of Pub. Safety, 148 Ohio St.3d 433, 2016-
Ohio-7987, 71 N.E.3d 258, ¶ 48. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
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prepared in anticipation of litigation.”41 Filming the police chase, 
however, was a result of turning on their sirens, not an investigative 
decision.42  
Finally, large portions of the recordings did not even involve 
investigatory functions.43 The dash-cam captured individuals taking 
pictures and video of the crash site and conversations with “no 
investigative value.”44  
ODPS explicitly affirmed the principle that “police incident reports 
are subject to disclosure,” citing both Steckman and Maurer.45 But 
ODPS also recognized that Maurer “did not adopt a per se rule” that all 
incident reports are subject to release, citing a 2004 case, which 
acknowledged that the identity of a child rape victim may be redacted 
from an incident report under an exemption for such disclosure created 
by a separate Ohio statute.46  
Though the Court found that most of the ODPS recordings did not fall 
under the CLEIR exception, ODPS may have chipped away at Maurer’s 
holding that an uncharged suspect’s name could not be redacted from an 
incident report. Mauer’s primary holding—that an incident report itself 
is not “work product” under 149.43(A)(2)(c)—remains good law.  But 
the reasoning of the ODPS Court may support the argument that the 
mere fact that information appears in an incident report does not 
automatically subject information to disclosure. As Justice French 
stated, “[a] case-by-case review is necessary.”47  
II. POLICE RESPONSES TO EMERGENCY CALLS SHOULD NOT 
AUTOMATICALLY CREATE A CONFIDENTIAL LAW ENFORCEMENT 
INVESTIGATORY RECORD 
The analysis of the dash-cam footage in ODPS shows what the Court 
is willing to consider in determining the applicability of the CLEIR 
exception to police video footage. First, consistent with the notion that 
the inquiry should be on a case-by-case basis, the Court did not identify 
a list of possible conditions that would exempt information contained in 
 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at ¶ 49. 
 44. State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Ohio Dept. of Pub. Safety, 148 Ohio St.3d 433, 2016-
Ohio-7987, 71 N.E.3d 258, ¶ 49. 
 45. Id. at ¶ 44.   
 46. Id.; see State ex rel. Beacon Journal Publishing Co. v. City of Akron (2004), 104 Ohio St.3d 
399, 2004-Ohio-6557, 819 N.E.2d 1087, ¶ 44 (“although police offense-and-incident reports are 
generally subject to disclosure, documents containing information that is exempt under state or federal 
law may be redacted”) (later superseded by statute). 
 47. ODPS, at ¶ 45. 
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a police video. Instead, the Court held that the 90 seconds of post-
Miranda interrogation that could be redacted constituted specific 
investigatory work product because the trooper “intended to secure 
admissible statements for the prosecution’s later use at trial.”48 Thus, a 
police officer’s intentional use of a video device to record an 
interrogation is relevant to whether information constitutes specific 
investigatory work product. Although the inquiry is fact-specific (and 
the law enforcement agency bears the burden of establishing its 
application), the ODPS Court described exactly what the trooper did to 
evidence her intent in making the recording: 
 
Harvey [the trooper] takes Teofilo [the suspect] to her patrol car, 
reads him his Miranda rights, and questions him . . . Harvey 
conducted her questioning of Teofilo inside the patrol car, away 
from public view. And by informing Teofilo of his rights as 
required by Miranda v. Arizona, Harvey intended to secure 
admissible statements for the prosecution's later use at trial.49  
A. The Adam Jones Case Study 
As applied to body-cam footage—using the Adam Jones incident as a 
case study—ODPS is the best predictor of how the Court would analyze 
the issue of disclosure.  Both situations involved police video footage. 
Both situations ended with the suspect being Mirandized, questioned, 
and arrested.50 CPD did not release the entire Jones footage until after 
the judge dismissed the charges (a second issue examined below).51 
However, CPD did release the footage of the events up until the police 
officer read Jones his Miranda rights.52 At first glance, this seems 
consistent with ODPS. But as the ODPS Court itself acknowledged, 
each case must be analyzed on a case-by-case basis. 
A review of the entire Jones recording shows that, unlike the suspect 
in ODPS, Jones was not shielded from public view when he was 
Mirandized. Rather, he was standing outside on a public street, 
surrounded by police officers, witnesses, and his own companions. The 
officer announced his intention to place Jones in the back seat of the 
cruiser so the officer could speak with other witnesses. But first, they 
 
 48. Id. at ¶ 46. 
 49. Id. (citations omitted). 
 50. Id. at ¶ 11; Full Video of Adam ‘Pacman’ Jones Arrest, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER (Mar. 9, 
2018), https://www.cincinnati.com/videos/news/2018/03/09/full-video-adam-pacman-jones-
arrest/101758716/ [hereinafter Full Video].  
 51. See supra note 7. 
 52. Id.  
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had to search Jones for weapons. There is no indication that the reason 
for the police call was weapons or drugs. The search of Jones’ person 
was for the safety of the officers and surrounding public, and not for the 
purpose of securing evidence for a future prosecution. Another officer 
opened the back door, but it was several minutes before Jones got into 
the cruiser. The officers struggled to search Jones, who became angry 
and resistant. Jones continued to shout at his companions to record the 
situation. One officer replied, “It’s all being recorded.” Several officers 
could be seen in the recording trying to subdue Jones and place him into 
the back seat. They told him to sit down in the back seat, but he refused. 
The recording is six minutes in before Jones gets into the police 
cruiser.53 
Second, after the officer finished reading Jones his Miranda rights, 
the officer told Jones, “I’m the guy arresting you, so you got to convince 
me you shouldn’t be arrested.” The officer asked if Jones wanted to tell 
him his version of what happened. This is also different from the 
exempted portion from the ODPS recording. When Jones asked his 
companion to record the situation, the officer said, “It’s all being 
recorded, but she can record it too if she wants to, that’s fine.” The 
officer’s questions were limited to asking Jones for his version of 
events. Jones denied that he assaulted anyone. After Jones was in the 
cruiser, the officer asked a security guard what happened. The recording 
centers on the security guard as he explained to the officer that Jones 
had caused a disturbance in the hotel. Later, the officer questioned one 
of Jones’ companions, who argued with the security guard about a cell 
phone. Last, the officer spoke with another officer who witnessed some 
of the events.54 
After the Miranda warning, the police officers’ interactions with 
Jones took place almost entirely outside of the patrol car. Unlike in 
ODPS, the police attempted to question Jones outside of the patrol car. 
This questioning did not lead to any meaningful exchange of 
information between Jones and the officer, because Jones strongly 
resisted his detention and denied that he assaulted the security guard. 
Instead of hearing much of Jones’ version of events surrounding the 
alleged assault, what instead ensued was a struggle between Jones and 
the officers as they attempted to search his person for dangerous items 
before placing him in the back seat of the police cruiser. This struggle 
was the basis for a second criminal charge against Jones: disorderly 
conduct.55 
In this way, the Jones incident is similar to what took place in ODPS. 
 
 53. See supra note 50. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
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Just as the trooper in ODPS recorded the fleeing vehicle, providing a 
basis for an eventual arrest, so too did the Jones recording capture a 
basis for Jones’ ultimate arrest, rather than the police officers’ 
investigation of the assault for which they were originally called.56 The 
parts of the ODPS recording that captured the suspect fleeing from the 
troopers were not exempt from disclosure, because that information later 
appeared in the incident report as basis for a criminal charge.57 
Third, when the ODPS Court stated that the police lack discretion for 
when their dash-cams activate, the Court assumed that police also lack 
discretion in whether they will respond to a call concerning a vehicle 
that will not pull over.58 If they are called to assist, they must respond. If 
they respond, they must turn on their lights. If they turn on their lights, 
their dash-cam begins recording.  
The Court’s assumptions about police responsibility should apply to 
body-cam footage as well. Pursuant to Cincinnati Police Department 
policy, “[o]fficers are required to activate their [Body Worn Camera] 
system during all law enforcement-related encounters and activities” and 
may deactivate their body-cams “only at the conclusion of the event or 
with supervisor approval.”59 Intentional or accidental failure to record 
and upload body-cam footage subjects an officer to possible discipline.60  
Procedure 12.540 shows that Cincinnati police officers do not have 
discretion in choosing whether or not they will use their body-cams. If 
they are engaged in a law enforcement-related activity, the body-cam 
must be recording. ODPS considered lack of discretion an important 
factor favoring release of dash-cam footage when it contrasted two Ohio 
State Highway Patrol Policies:  
 
[T]roopers are expected to record all pursuits and traffic 
stops, regardless of whether a criminal prosecution may follow. 
The dash-cams here began to record automatically as soon as the 
troopers activated their emergency lights and siren, so the troopers 
did not exercise any investigatory discretion in activating their 
dash-cams. In contrast, OSHP does not require troopers to record 
crashes and leaves it to the discretion of troopers to 
determine when evidence at a crash scene is necessary for 
prosecution. In those circumstances, respondents would have a 
 
 56. See State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Ohio Dept. of Pub. Safety, 148 Ohio St.3d 433, 2016-
Ohio-7987, 71 N.E.3d 258, ¶ 47. 
 57. Id.  
 58. Id. at ¶ 48. 
 59. Body Worn Camera Policy and Procedure 12.540, City of Cincinnati, 
https://www.cincinnati-oh.gov/police/assets/File/Procedures/12540.pdf (last visited at March 12, 2018). 
 60. Id. 
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better argument that a dash-cam recording was prepared in 
anticipation of litigation. The troopers here, however, did not make 
any investigative decisions to activate their dash-cams.61 
 
So too, Cincinnati police officers are required by official policy, 
under threat of formal discipline, to activate their body-cams when 
performing law enforcement activities. Under ODPS, Procedure 12.540 
operates analogously to the OHSP policy requiring troopers to record all 
pursuits and traffic stops. Because Cincinnati police officers do not 
make any investigative decisions in activating their body-cams, there is 
no compelling argument that any particular piece of body-cam footage is 
prepared in anticipation of litigation. 
What is lacking in ODPS is a reliable guiding principle to assist 
courts in their case-by-case review of public information nondisclosures 
when a public office claims the work product exception. But one helpful 
principle would be Chief Justice O’Connor’s work-product argument in 
her concurrence in Caster. She advocates a return to the pre-Steckman 
definition of “work product,” which would not include objective facts 
and data collected by law enforcement. Her proposed definition of 
“work product” would exclude material like the Jones footage.62  
The Jones events took place on a city street with members of the 
public standing nearby, even conversing with the police officers.63 Such 
objective content should not be withheld from disclosure on the basis 
that it is investigatory work product. On two occasions, when Jones 
called upon his companions to record the events, two different officers 
advised Jones and everyone else within earshot that it was already being 
recorded, most likely referring to their own body-cams. In asking his 
companions to record, Jones sought an objective record of the events as 
they unfolded. The police officer’s response to Jones’ request—that it 
was already being recorded—was not just a way to address Jones’ 
concern for gathering an objective record, but arguably also an 
affirmation that the recording would be made available to him in 
criminal discovery.64 
But even under ODPS, because of the significant weight the decision 
gives to differing facts, and because so much of the Jones recording 
portrays a struggle to get Jones into the police cruiser rather than 
investigatory work product, the CPD’s refusal to release the entire 
 
 61. See State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Ohio Dept. of Pub. Safety, 148 Ohio St.3d 433, 2016-
Ohio-7987, 71 N.E.3d 258, ¶ 48. 
 62. State ex rel. Caster v. Columbus, 151 Ohio St.3d 425, 2016-Ohio-8394, 89 N.E.3d 598, ¶¶ 
60-65. 
 63. See supra note 50.  
 64. Id. 
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recording until after resolution of the charges was unjustified. And the 
timing of CPD’s release of the recording raises another issue: at what 
point does the CLEIR exception expire? 
III. THE COMPLETION OF TRIAL IS STILL TOO LATE 
The Supreme Court of Ohio overruled Steckman in part in Caster.65 
Steckman had held that once a record becomes exempt as a “trial 
preparation record,” it remains exempt until all trials, actions, or 
proceedings have been exhausted.66 The Court acknowledged the 
harshness of the holding, but it was based on the importance of bringing 
an end to criminal defendants’ perceived abuse of R.C. 149.43 to avoid 
the limits of Criminal Rule 16.67 
Caster states that Steckman did not explicitly hold that “the specific-
investigatory-work-product exception extends beyond the completion of 
the trial.”68 Nevertheless, post-trial withholding seemed to be the 
implication for one of the cases consolidated under Steckman.69 After 
Steckman, the Court would hold in State ex rel. WLWT-TV5 v. Leis that 
“the specific-investigatory-work-product exception applies beyond the 
completion of direct appeals.”70 The “central reason” the Court decided 
both Steckman and WLWT-TV5 the way it did was “the seeming 
disparity between the information a defendant could obtain to use at 
retrial compared to what the defendant could obtain through discovery 
under former Crim. R. 16.”71  
By the time the Court decided Caster, however, Criminal Rule 16 had 
changed considerably.72 The revised Criminal Rule 16 “expands the 
State’s duty to disclose materials and information beyond what was 
required under the prior rule.”73 Upon a defendant’s written request, the 
state must, prior to trial, provide any “written or recorded statement by a 
witness in the state’s case-in-chief” and all “reports from peace officers, 
the Ohio State Highway Patrol, and federal law enforcement agents.”74 
These amendments greatly increased defendant access to information 
prior to trial.  
But even though Caster rightly overruled Steckman, it maintained that 
 
 65. State ex rel. Caster v. Columbus, 151 Ohio St.3d 425, 2016-Ohio-8394, 89 N.E.3d 598, ¶ 47. 
 66. State ex rel. Steckman v. Jackson (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 420, 639 N.E.2d 83, 92. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Caster, ¶ 33. 
 69. Id. 
 70. State ex rel. WLWT-TV5 v. Leis, 77 Ohio St.3d 357, 1997-Ohio-273, 673 N.E.2d 1365. 
 71. Caster, at ¶ 35. 
 72. Id. at ¶ 37. 
 73. Id. at ¶ 37 (quoting 2010 Staff Note to Crim. R. 16(B)). 
 74. Id. 
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the CLEIR exception did not expire until the end of trial. The Steckman 
Court hinged its analysis on restoring to Criminal Rule 16 its intended 
limits by taming a perceived abuse of R.C. 149.43. Criminal Rule 16 has 
been revised, but the vestigial Steckman-era restriction on R.C. 149.43 
remains.  
The Cincinnati Police Department displayed its understanding of the 
law when it did not release the full Adam Jones video until after the 
judge dismissed the charges and the case was resolved. Just as Steckman 
sought to harmonize the Public Records Act with Criminal Rule 16, the 
Supreme Court of Ohio should seek to do the same by loosening the 
restrictive interpretation that the specific-investigatory-work-product 
exception remains in force until after the trial ends. The Steckman 
concern for defendants’ cheating the process has evaporated with the 
revised Criminal Rule 16, which essentially provides for open-file 
discovery.  
Caster sets the expiration date on the work-product exception at the 
end of trial, but this is an inappropriately late point at which to make 
public records available. On this issue, Chief Justice O’Connor’s 
concurrence is not as astute as it is on work product, arguing that 
“disclosure to a defendant is not the same as disclosure to the public, 
and public policy supports withholding nonroutine law enforcement 
records.”75 She states that restricting public access to records prevents 
the media from “trying an active case in the news.” Id. The First 
Amendment is not on her side here. In fact, it is at odds with the 
contention that reporting on trials is bad public policy.  
The Chief Justice also argues that, if a criminal defendant is innocent, 
permitting disclosure could permit the real perpetrator to access 
information which could help him or her evade detection.76 But this 
concern is no more legitimate during trial than it is after trial. A yet-to-
be detained perpetrator may still request public records after the trial’s 
resolution, and use that information to continue evading capture. 
Delaying disclosure until the trial ends does not address this concern. 
She argues that the release of materials revealing law-enforcement 
investigatory strategies is dangerous, “particularly if knowledge of such 
strategies would empower criminals to avoid detection.”77 But again, 
setting the end of trial as the point at which public records become 
available for disclosure does not resolve this concern. Besides, R.C. 
149.43(A)(2)(c) prohibits the release of confidential investigatory 
strategies, not merely “law-enforcement investigatory strategies.” If the 
Public Records Act is to be “liberally construed in favor of public 
 
 75. Caster, at ¶ 70. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at ¶ 66. 
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access,”78 then adding restrictions on top of the Act has no place in 
judicial reasoning.79 
In partially overruling Steckman, Caster indicated that the law 
required an expiration date on the unavailability of public records. 
However, the completion of trial unnecessarily delays the point when 
public records should be available. The First Amendment confers to the 
press a freedom that shall not be abridged. On its face, R.C. 149.43 does 
not abridge that freedom. But the Ohio Supreme Court’s judicial 
interpretation of R.C. 149.43 limits the transparency which that statute 
was intended to deliver.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
Ohio’s lower courts and public agencies respond to the rules handed 
down by Ohio’s high court, as evidenced when the Cincinnati Police 
Department did not release the full Jones arrest recording until after his 
charges were dismissed. The considerations the Court recognized in 
ODPS show that a member of the public seeking release of body-cam 
footage should marshal any facts tending to show that a police officer 
lacks discretion in activating his or her body-cam. Within ODPS are the 
arguments that will be important to increasing public transparency 
where police activity is concerned.  
However, the First Amendment’s guarantee of freedom of the press is 
a strong counterargument to the Court’s justification for delaying 
disclosure until the close of trial or other likely proceedings. But until 
the Court acknowledges this argument and arguments like it, the 
window of public transparency in Ohio remains less than clear. 
 
 
 78. Id. at ¶ 69 
 79. Rule 16 may provide the appropriate milestone for releasing CLEIR materials.  Once the 
defendant receives the material, it is hard to see why the court should continue to delay public access. 
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